REPLY TO CRITICS OF THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY Richard A. Posner*
The Review is to be commended for having assembled so formidable an array of distinguished scholars well qualified to criticize my Holmes Lectures. Nussbaum is a leading normative moral philosopher (what I call in the Lectures an "academic moralist'), with a side interest in law. Dworkin is also a distinguished academic moralist, but in addition he is the leading scholar of jurisprudence in the Englishspeaking world and a prominent constitutional theorist. Dean Kronman has a background in moral philosophy that has informed most of his influential academic writings. And Justice Fried and Judge Noonan are probably the most distinguished living judges who, before ascending the bench, made important contributions as academics to both jurisprudence and moral theory. Those who think, as I do, that John Stuart Mill was correct when he said in the second essay in On Liberty that no position can be confidently affirmed until it has been tested in the fires of hostile criticism' will understand the importance of my five critics' Responses -and of this Reply -to a proper evaluation of my Lectures.
Having now read the Responses, I am more confident of the position taken in the Lectures, although willing to concede the need for amplification or correction in several particulars. The many disagreements among the five critics, their own criticisms of academic moralism and its applicability to law, the vulnerability (which I shall try to demonstrate) of their arguments, the defensive cast of some of the Responses and the scornful tone of the others, their sheer length, and their failure (with the very partial exception of Dworkin's Response) even to attempt to demonstrate how moral reasoning can actually convince doubters or aid judges reinforce my belief in the essential soundness of the Lectures.
I. RONALD DwoRKiN I am grateful to Professor Dworkin for supplying -and on the very first page of his Response, where it cannot be missed -a potent new argument for my position. Let me restate it. Either my arguments against the usefulness of moral theory are successful, and then I draft-card burning, are not judgments of law." s He does not qualify "judgments of law" with the word "constitutional." Nor does Kennedy do so in describing Dworkin's position.
Dworkin also accuses Kennedy, and derivatively me, of incorrectly attributing to him a belief in "explicit consideration of distributive consequences rather than reliance on efficiency." 9 To refute this attribution, he cites a passage in his book Freedom's Law denying that "economic equality" should be a constitutional right.' 0 Again, Dworkin misrepresents Kennedy's claim. The claim was that Dworkin believes that courts should consider distributive consequences rather than efficiency in deciding cases. Dworkin does not deny that claim. He could not, since he believes that the common law should be shaped not by efficiency, but rather by an egalitarian conception that he calls "equality of resources."" Because, when he is mounted on his polemical steed, Dworkin has difficulty giving an accurate account of his own writings, one should not be optimistic about the accuracy of his account of mine. I can barely recognize the argument of my Lectures in his reformulation of it. Either I am an unclear writer, or he is indeed an uncharitable reader. I spent much time at the beginning of the Lectures trying as best I could to explain, at the risk of losing my readers to tedium, what I meant by "moral theory," "moral skepticism," "moral relativism," and so forth; yet Dworkin is unable to extract any meaning from my efforts. (Affected obtuseness about an opponent's argument is a common tactic in philosophical debate; it is also employed in Nussbaum's Response.) He says that I erroneously classify moral relativism, moral subjectivism, and moral skepticism as forms of "external [moral) skepticism" in his sense, whereas the focus of his paper on moral skepticism that I cited is internal skepticism.' 2 Internal skepticism is indeed the focus of that paper; but all I meant was that "moral relativism," "moral subjectivism," and "moral skepticism" as I defined them in my Lectures fit his category of external skepticism. I should have thought my meaning clear. Passing on to another of the points Dworkin makes in his footnote nine, I thought I had made clear what I meant by "moral realism," "right answers," and "metaphysics" by quoting Dworkin's colleague Thomas Nagel on "right answers moral realism" 3 and, by way of contrast, Charles Larmore on "metaphysical moral realism."
I should have thought it also clear that I was not contradicting myself in saying that a society's unquestioning acceptance of a taboo against intermarriage would not make the taboo morally right. That acceptance would make the taboo part of the moral code of the society, but people in other societies would be entitled to embrace a different morality, one that would condemn the taboo. Similarly, the Chinese might "validly" condemn the Irish law on abortion, and vice versatwo moral claims, both valid within the presuppositions of the culture in which they are made, but incompatible, and with no higher morality in light of which the difference in opinion could be arbitrated.
Dworkin says that I argue that his proposal for judges to use moral theory to decide cases would fall flat if he substituted "political theory" for "moral theory"; 14 he points out that political theory and moral theory are very similar. They are -I made that point in my Lecturesbut he has misquoted me. I said that his proposal would fall flat if he argued in political rather than moral "terms," that is, if he acknowledged that he was asking the courts to enact his left-liberal policy agenda, the agenda summarized by Duncan Kennedy.
Dworkin implies that I believe that pragmatism can resolve the moral disagreement between the prolife and prochoice camps.' 5 On the contrary, pragmatism, at least my sort of pragmatism, recognizes that the moral disagreement is insoluble and wishes to use this recognition as the starting point when deciding what abortion rights, if any, to recognize.
Dworkin again shows his recklessness as a critic in his discussion of my comments on "British legal practice," which he claims are "illinformed.
1 6 The term "British legal practice" is a solecism, since Britain (he means, I take it, the United Kingdom) does not have a unitary legal system. The comment of mine that he claims is "illinformed," and moreover inconsistent with what I wrote in a recent book on English law (that is, the law of England and Wales, but not of Scotland or Northern Ireland), is that English judges so rarely have to make policy choices that when they do so they have the feeling that "they're step[ping] outside the law," a term that I quoted from H.L.A.
'3 This is Dworkin's position. In his Response, he puts it this way: "Any moral principle, no matter how thoroughly embedded in our culture, language, and practice, may yet be false -or, no matter how thoroughly rejected, may yet be true." Id. at 1719. He states this dogmatically; he does not acknowledge that it is a contestable position.
14 Id. at 173o n. 19 Id. at 3 1-32 (footnote omitted).
20 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1727 n.32. The reference to "British practice" is of course a small mistake; Dworkin's reference elsewhere in his Response to the Equal Protection Clause as protecting only citizens, see id. at 1732, is only a little larger; but these mistakes, like his uncritical belief that references to "fairness" in tort cases invoke moral categories, are suggestive of a lack of interest in the actual texture of law, a lack highly consistent with his overall approach. 21 See id. at I728 n.32 (citing Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [i993] 2 W.L.R. 316 (C.A.)). Dworkin calls it a "parallel case" to the Supreme Court's recent euthanasia cases, id., echoing the argument of the philosophers' brief that there is no morally significant difference between killing and failing to save. This is the same mistake that Judith Jarvis Thomson makes in equating abortion by a rape victim to a refusal to save a famous violinist.
22 See Airedale NHS 'f"ust v. Bland, [I993] I All E.R. 858 (H.L.).
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Bland would wish to be remembered," those judges had not taken into account "spiritual values which, for example, a member of the Roman Catholic church would regard as relevant in assessing such benefit." 23 With the moral issue thus a standoff, Browne-Wilkinson opined that "the moral, social and legal issues raised by this case should be considered by Parliament, 24 and added that he had reached his own conclusion about how to decide the case on "narrow, legalistic grounds."
25
I could go on beating back Dworkin's charges of obscurity, ignorance, and contradiction one by one, but I think I've said enough to induce a warranted distrust in his accuracy, so let me turn instead to the significant propositions in his Response. The first is that everyone who isn't a clod does moral reasoning and does it by starting with an intuition and then defending it against arguments, and that all the academic moralist does is carry this process of justificatory expansion or ascent (what the legal process school of the 1950s called "reasoned elaboration' to higher levels of abstraction. This is not in fact how the "common man," which is to say virtually everyone not professionally engaged in moral philosophy, arrives at his moral opinions. As I said in my Lectures, moral arguments, even when made by someone with the analytical and polemical skills of a Ronald Dworkin, are too feeble to move people. I offered some evidence in support of that proposition; he offers no contrary evidence (none of the critics does), but instead tries some intellectual jujitsu. He claims that my thesis that moral theory does not provide a "solid basis" for moral judgments is itself a moral thesis. 26 But his entire argument for this claim consists of translating "solid basis" into "sound basis" and then equating "sound" with "morally sound." 27 This definitional chain, forged without an explanation, is arbitrary. I argue that moral reasoning in the style of Dworkin and other academic moralists is too weak to shake anyone's moral intuitions: not too weak morally, but epistemologically -that is, as a matter of logic and evidence. This is not to say that utilitarianism or Kantianism, or any other normative moral position, wholesale or retail, is unsound, but only that the arguments pro or con are too flaccid to induce a sensible person to change his beliefs or behavior.
Dworkin asks us to imagine that there are many people who, though not philosophers or even intellectuals, have "a yearning for ethical and moral integrity" or "want a vision of how to live. 
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their views about abortion presuppose some more general position about the connection between sentience and interests or rights." 29 The picture is of people standing around waiting to connect with Dworkin, who speaks in just those lofty terms.
3 0 I don't think there are many people like that; very few people outside the academy talk in the highfalutin' style of academic moralism or can understand arguments couched in that style; how many even know what "sentience" means? Dworkin takes me to be denying the value of a parent's appeal to a child's sense of fairness.
3 1 That is absurd. My criticisms are of academic moralism, the high-flown stuff of Dworkin's own writings. It is especially odd for him to locate his work on the same spectrum with parental instruction because he defines "morally responsible people" as people who "worry about whether their [moral] convictions are sound." 3 2 This definition excludes children and limits morally responsible people to people who are a potential audience for Dworkin. I define a morally responsible person as a person who behaves morally. I shall remind the reader when I get to Nussbaum's Response that being moral and being reflective are not the same thing, and may even be in tension.
Even if many people could understand and be moved by Dworkin's arguments about abortion and other issues of law or public policy, as soon as these people were exposed to counterarguments they would be moved right back to wherever they had been before reading Dworkin. Every move in normative moral argument can be checked by a countermove. The discourse of moral theory is interminable because indeterminate. Dworkin no doubt believes that he has won his duels with his academic opponents over abortion and euthanasia and the like, but one like myself who does not have strong views on these questions rates these duels as ties.
Dworkin tries to refute pragmatic moral skepticism by broadening the definition of moral theory to encompass all normative argument (this is a recurrent feature of the Responses), so that a judge would have to be speechless to avoid doing moral theory. But the simplest type of normative argument -argument in reference to stipulated goals,-eludes even Dworkin's definitional sweep. That kind of argument cannot be understood as moral. Were there a consensus that the goal of accident law should be to minimize the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs, letting the insurance markets buffer the wealth effects of accidents, then it would be possible to evaluate the 29 Id. at 1722. 30 Here is a sample of Dworkin's rhetoric, picked virtually at random: "The courts are the capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes, but not its seers and prophets. It falls to philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have." DWORKIN, supra note ii, at 407. 31 See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1724. 32 Id. at 1722.
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doctrines of that law without entering contested moral territory. Policy arguments would be omnipresent, but they would owe nothing to moral theory. Consensus on ends or goals is found in some areas of law, but not in all. When it comes to issues like abortion and euthanasia, there is no consensus on ends, and so the issues have to be resolved by force, elections, compromise, legislation, judges' values, public opinion, default, exhaustion, distraction by other issues, changes in religious belief (not themselves induced by moral theory) or in demographics or in technology, considerations of feasibility, or emotional appeals (for example, the film The Silent Scream). Moral theory won't play a role.
33
Dworkin confuses the issue by dividing the normative realm into moral theory on the one hand and "instrumental or strategic considerations" on the other. 3 4 But "instrumental" and "strategic" are not the same, and joining them muddies the waters. "Strategic" has overtones of game theory, warfare, and Machiavellian scheming. The relevant distinction is between reasoning over ends and reasoning over means. I argue in my Lectures that the latter is productive and the former unproductive. Dworkin presents no counterargument.
Might there be a way of reasoning over moral ends without using moral theory? I don't think so. Whether or not the academic moralist or his legal counterpart decides to trundle out the great names of moral philosophy is a question of taste rather than of substance. I claim that there is no profitable reasoning over ends, though of course there is frequent choice among ends -choice that is determined, however, by things other than the "weight" of opposing arguments. I am speaking of ultimate ends -for there are of course mediate onesbut it is the ultimate ends that are in contention in the moral debates over abortion, euthanasia, and the other topics that Dworkin likes to discuss.
He argues that a moral relativist, conceding that there are moral truths --even if only local rather than universal -must likewise concede a role, albeit only a local one, to moral theories based on those truths. 35 But this point, too, founders on Dworkin's failure to distinguish reasoning over ends from reasoning over means. If there is consensus within a community on some moral principle, then arguments 
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over the validity of the principle drop out, and the issue becomes the principle's proper application. A good example is the principle that infanticide is wrong. It is not a universal principle, but it is solidly entrenched in our society. Dworkin is not interested in the areas of moral consensus within our society. He wants to talk about precisely those issues that cannot be stabilized by reference to a local consensus. Nor can they be stabilized by stretching consensus notions to cover them (as by appealing to our consensus on the immorality of infanticide to resolve the issue of abortion) -this stretching being what Dworkin fancily describes as "showing the implications of principles and ideals latent in the public culture of modern democracies." 36 The moral theorist either picks controversial principles that determine his preferred outcome, or picks consensus principles and draws an arbitrary line connecting them to that outcome. Dworkin contends that moral issues are inescapable in adjudication. In evaluating this contention, we shall do well to distinguish among three possible relations between a moral issue and a case. First,. the legal issue may have moral significance to some part of the community; the legal issue of abortion rights has moral significance to prolife and prochoice people. Second, judges might decide some cases on moral grounds. And third, they might decide some cases using the argumentative methods of academic moralism. I have no quarrel with the first relation between law and morality -or with the second. Some legal principles, notably those of the criminal law, are plainly informed by the moral opinions of the community. But the application of a moral principle to a legal issue must not be confused with taking sides on contested moral issues and using normative moral philosophy to resolve the contest. That is the relation between morality and law that I question. You don't find moral theory deployed in appeals from convictions for rape or murder, even though the criminalizing of rape and murder is based upon a moral principle; and this absence is no loss.
There are pseudomoral issues in law. Dworkin argues that when judges use moral terms such as "fairness," as they often do, they must be doing moral theory. 37 But as Holmes pointed out in The Path of the Law -it is one of his major themes -the same word may be used in a moral and in a legal sense, and the two senses need not coincide. 38 Dworkin has to unpack the word "fairness," and he has not done so.
The threefold distinction that I have sketched can help us see the fallacy in Dworkin's argument that when a court decides a case in which there is a moral issue, it cannot avoid making a moral judgment. Suppose Congress amended the Constitution to abolish the con- examples where Dworkin's approach of thinking of law as a branch of moral philosophy can lead.) All three decisions may have affected public opinion or even the public's moral views; but none of the decisions was a contribution to moral truth or value. Like everyone else, judges have moral views, and those views may -sometimes quite properly -influence judicial decisions. I just don't think that their (that anyone's) moral views are likely to be improved by immersion in moral theory, or that judicial decisions furnish right answers to moral questions, such as the moral rights of a fetus.
Dworkin is the only one of my critics to take up a specific issue and try to show how moral theory can resolve it. He sketches a moral argument for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education: that the Equal Protection Clause does not allow government to justify a law on the basis that some citizens (actually the Equal Protection Clause is not limited to citizens) are inferior to others or less deserving of consideration, and that it is demonstrable that official segregation could not be justified on any alternative assumption. 4 0 I have no objection to reading an anticaste principle into the Equal Protection Clause, given the history of the Clause and the recession of nineteenth-century racist theories. But you don't need moral theory to do this. I don't see how it could do this, because if nineteenth-century racial science were true, which is an issue of science rather than of moral theory, it would mean that blacks were inferior, and then there would be an argument for providing them a different public education.
.9 See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1729-30 & n.43. 40 See id. at 1731-32.
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The problem for the Court in Brown was to exclude interpretations of segregation that were rivals of the caste interpretation. That was neither a scientific nor a moral problem, but a political problem; the Court wanted to avoid accusing the Southern states of operating a caste system. There was no work for moral theory to do in the case, except mischief. 4 1 The problem for equal protection today is that the anticaste principle does not work in the areas (such as abortion and homosexual rights) in which people want to use the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate laws; but moral theory doesn't help there either. It's otiose in either type of case.
If Dworkin wishes to continue our debate, here is a method by which he can test his claim that moral reasoning is omnipresent in judicial opinions. I have written more than i5oo judicial opinions, covering pretty much the whole range of fields and issues that Dworkin has discussed over his long career (including civil disobedience and, yes, a murdering heir case), except for euthanasia and homosexual rights (but I've had cases involving transsexuals). Let him find, if he can, in a sample, random or otherwise, of my opinions the proof that no judge (at least no "eminent" judge) can escape having to do moral philosophy.
IT. CHARLES FRIED
Justice Fried makes a good point against me -that in defining morality as the set of duties to others that are designed to check our merely self-interested, emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious questions of conduct, I was implying that moral judgments cannot be reduced to raw emotion and therefore acknowledging a role for moral reasoning in those judgments. 42 That may indeed be an implication of what I said. But it is not what I meant, as should have been clear from the Lectures as a whole. The social function of moral duties, such as the duty (in our society) not to respond to the discovery of the adultery of one's spouse by killing the adulterer, is indeed to impose a check, in the interest of social order, on the instinctive or impulsive reaction to an affront, a threat, or an opportunity. In other words, a moral duty is like a leash -and a dog is constrained by a leash without having to reason. When I swerve to avoid hitting a pedestrian or help an elderly person across the street, I am not enacting the conclu- 41 sion of a process of moral reflection. A check on an emotional reaction can be another emotion (for example, fear might check hunger); it needn't be an argument. I take Fried to be meeting me halfway when he describes the arguments that academic moralists make as "argument fragments." 43 What I would like to see now is a demonstration of how those fragments can be assembled into a convincing argument. Fried says they can be, and remarks intimidatingly that Rawls and O'Neill are the peers of G6del and Fermat,4 but he gives no examples of convincing moral argument except to cite his own book on contracts, 45 and so I will content myself with a countercitation. 46 I am tantalized by his reticence, because he is derisive on the one hand about the "whole catechism of canonical left-liberal opinions" 4 7 (read: Dworkin's opinions) and on the other hand about the natural-law theory expounded by John Finnis. 4 " One would like to hear how moral philosophy can navigate between these shoals.
Fried wants particularly to show that academic moralism influences judges. This surprises me. He has written that lawyers (and implicitly judges) should think of themselves not as social architects or social engineers, but as social "janitors," 4 9 and that law is emphatically not philosophy: "So what is it that lawyers and judges know that philosophers and economists do not? The answer is simple: the law." 5 0 I had not thought he meant that the difference between philosophers and lawyers is that philosophers know only philosophy, and lawyers know philosophy plus law; that would be an awful lot to ask of lawyers, and would make philosophers seem a lazy bunch, unless they too have a second field. But now he cites three judicial opinions to show that judges do moral philosophy after all -one by Judge (now Justice) Breyer, one by Justice Thomas, and one by Justice Fried.-' It is instructive to examine these opinions. (Oddly, none is a majority opinion.) 
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The issue in Breyer's case was whether remarks by a supervisor revealed anti-union animus, and Breyer's opinion discusses the problems involved in drawing inferences. 5 2 It is possible, though not obvious from his opinion, that Breyer was drawing on epistemology, but as there was nothing remotely resembling a moral issue in the case, I cannot see how the opinion can be thought to illustrate the use of moral theory by judges. The issue in Thomas's case was the constitutionality of a state statute banning the advertising of liquor prices. 5 3 His opinion argues that government shouldn't be allowed to keep people ignorant (for example, of the price of lawful products). 5 4 There is no reference to anything recognizable as moral theory, unless the argument that I have just mentioned, on which Thomas (who is said by Fried to have "dabbled" in political philosophy 55 ) does not elaborate, can be thought a product of it. Fried's own opinion involves a registration requirement for convicted sex offenders. 5 6 One will search the opinion in vain for moral theory. The heart of the opinion is the proposition that for the state to justify "a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation" of a convicted person by the urgency of the need to prevent his inflicting further harm on the community, "the urgency must be shown by the severity of the harm and the likelihood of its occurrence. 5 7 This sounds like Learned Hand's cost-benefit formula for determining negligence, 5 8 rather than like philosophy. 5 9 Fried makes no effort to derive the Fried formula from moral theory, unless it is through moral theory that we learn that "we do not have a general regime regulating adult competent persons as such," that " [p] ersons are left to choose freely and if they make the wrong choices they are subject to retrospective condemnation and punishment. § 6.z (5th ed. 998). Earlier in his opinion, Fried said in like vein that the registration requirement "may be imposed after a careful weighing of three factors: the kind and severity of the regulatory imposition, the kind and severity of the danger sought to be averted, and the aptness of the fit between the remedial measure and the danger to be averted." Doe, 686 N.E.2d at ioi6 (Fried, J., concurring).
59 Fried also conjectures that one of Justice Brennan's opinions (once again, not a majority opinion) was directly influenced by an essay of Ronald Dworkin's on affirmative action. See reader 6 ' -that, like Dworkin, Fried equates moral principle to principle and morality to normativity. Fried tries to demonstrate the influence of the ideas of moral philosophy on history. In this endeavor he draws a sharper distinction than I would be inclined to draw between Lenin and Marx. The former is, in Fried's words, a "master rhetorician[]." The latter he groups with writers who are "systematic, elaborately reasoned, attentive to and careful about method, explicit about premises, and explicit as well about how conclusions flow from them." Marx, Fried says, is a thinker "who [sought] to persuade by argument and reason, not... by exhortation and rhetoric. '62 I do not recognize Marx in this description. He was highly rhetorical, was neither careful about method nor explicit about his premises, was a prophet rather than a thinker and a journalist rather than an academic. I am surprised that Fried would wish to enroll him with Rawls, O'Neill, and Fried himself in the ranks of academic moralism. But there is a more important reason for leaving him out than his lack of the professorial virtues and vocation. Marx was one of those moralists whose moral claims are entangled with factual claims, such as the misery of life under capitalism, the growing disparity between the wealth of the capitalists and the poverty of the workers, the inevitability of a workers' revolution, and the withering away of the state and attainment of earthly paradise upon the completion of that revolution. Every one of these factual claims has been falsified by history. A moral philosopher whose moral claims are as dependent on factual claims as Marx's can fairly be considered refuted when his factual claims are falsified. So Marx has been refuted -but I certainly will not deny that he has been influential.
As for Locke, Kant, and Hegel, the unrefuted moral philosophers who Fried claims have influenced the world outside the academy, they did their work in milieus that cannot be compared to today's world of academic moral philosophy, because knowledge was so much less specialized and the academy so much less professionalized. And I have doubts that even those three great philosophers influenced the real world, doubts not stilled by the references in Fried's footnote twentyeight. But as the question of intellectual influence is a profoundly difficult one, I will content myself with merely recording my doubt that there would have been no American Revolution, or that it would have eventuated in a different constitutional structure, had Locke never lived.
But I should say a word more about specialization. As late as the nineteenth century, the boundaries between philosophy and the sci- ences -both the natural and the social sciences -were indistinct and often crossed. Bentham was a lawyer, economist, and practical reformer, as well as a philosopher, and his suggestions for the reform of criminal justice can be accepted by people who reject utilitarianism; the suggestions do not collapse when their philosophical scaffolding is removed. Locke's influential political theory can be detached from its metaphysical foundations in Christian theology and its moral foundations in the idea that productive labor creates entitlements. Such political innovations as republicanism, the separation of powers, the system of checks and balances, and the secularization of politics can likewise be detached from their philosophical aegis and evaluated without regard to philosophical principles. So Locke can be discussed by both political scientists and moral philosophers, but the discussions by the political scientists are likely to be more fruitful.
Herbert Spencer, another of Fried's examples of influential moral thinkers, 63 was a leading proponent of social Darwinism, a body of thought that I concede was influential in nineteenth-century America and elsewhere. And it can be described as a moral philosophy. But it was influential because it was marketed and bought as science -as, indeed, was Marxism ("scientific socialism'). Also like Marx, Spencer is thoroughly discredited. It is ironic that Fried's best exemplars of the influence of moral philosophy on behavior are also the most discredited. 64 ll. ANTHONY KRONMAN I find much with which to agree in Dean Kronman's Response, in particular his criticism of the professionalization of moral philosophy. And I am pleased that, like me, he thinks the Supreme Court is right not to treat law as a "subfield of morality" 65 (contrary to Dworkin, whose claims about the relation between morality and law Kronman calls "extravagant" 66 ) and not to decide the abortion or euthanasia cases on the basis of briefs submitted by philosophers. A large area of disagreement remains, however. The key to it, oddly enough, lies in Kronman's claim that my Lectures are permeated by "pessimism" and 
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are "despairing from start to finish." 67 I would not be surprised to be described as a complacent optimist, a Pollyanna who revels in the fall of communism, the discomfiture of collectivists, the worldwide triumph (however brief it may prove to be) of free markets and commercial values, and the wealth, freedom, diversity, opportunity, and dazzling technological advances powered by that triumph. The pessimist is Kronman, because he believes that moral philosophy, which he agrees is in a sorry state, is essential to civilization. I do not believe that. Kronman's pessimism may result in part from his using words like "moral" and particularly "reason" too broadly; this imprecision may have confused him about what is really at stake (very little) in the decline of normative moral philosophy. He says that "[tihe kind of moral quandary in which ordinary men and women find themselves from time to time, and which demands the exercise of reason, is for judges a routine predicament." 6 8 What is true is that judges routinely confront issues that cannot be resolved by the application of an algorithmthat require instead the application of "practical reason," which (in the sense in which I am using the term) is the ensemble of methods, including gut reaction, that people use to make decisions when scientific or mathematical or logical exactness is unattainable. This means that judicial opinions will often fail to achieve the certitude of a logical, mathematical, or scientific demonstration. But it does not mean that judicial opinions are unreasoned, and it certainly does not mean that the judge is in a "predicament" or a "moral quandary" and has to employ something called "moral reason" 69 to get out. The world of inquiry isn't divided into just two compartments, the exact (including the logical, the mathematical, and the scientific) and the moral. Editing a newspaper requires the constant use of practical reason, but only very occasionally the making of moral judgments. The same is true of adjudication. Judges get into moral quandaries only when the law points to a result that violates their deeply held moral beliefs. That is not a routine predicament in this country, and moral philosophy will not help judges out of it. As I argued in my Lectures, moral philosophy is good only at posing, and not at resolving, moral dilemmas. Judges do legal reasoning, which is not much different from ordinary reasoning about nonmoral issues; rarely do they engage in moral reasoning, and when they do, it is without the help of academic moral philosophy.
67 Id. at 1753; see also id. at 1754 (mentioning the "pessimism that gives his Lectures their bleak and depressing tone").
68 Id. at 1762. This is the equivalent of saying that the ordinary man or woman is sick occasionally, but the doctor is sick all the time. Incidentally, judges are "ordinary men and women." 69 Id.
I bridle at the suggestion that it is a judicial responsibility to help "a people achieve[] ... self-conscious maturity. '70 Such a view of the judicial role implies a condescending view of the American people, echoing the patronizing and self-important plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 7 ' (reaffirming the core of Roe v. Wade), in which three Supreme Court Justices declared that Americans' "very 'belief in themselves' as "people who aspire to live according to the rule of law" is "not readily separable from their understanding of the [Supreme] Court." 72 The American people are as mature as any other people and, in any event, don't need and won't benefit from judicial efforts to help them to mature further. Although judicial decisions (along with everything else -except possibly moral theory) may have some effect on moral opinion and behavior, it does not follow that judges should think of themselves as the moral tutors of the nation, as Kronman (an Aristotelian, hence one to whom moral preachment de haut en bas comes naturally) would like them to do. Kronman might do well to ponder Jiirgen Habermas's rebuke to American constitutional theorists for casting the Supreme Court in the role of "a pedagogical guardian or regent" of an incompetent "sovereign," the people. 73 "The addressees of law would not be able to understand themselves as its authors if the legislator [or judge] were to discover human rights as pregiven moral facts that merely need to be enacted as positive law." 74 (These passages, incidentally, are a precise description of Dworkin's constitutional theory.)
Kronman's use of the expression "self-conscious maturity" and his remarks that " [r] eason is the perfection of collective as well as individual character" and that "[o]nly through moral reflection can a people understand its values and hence itself" 75 seem to be linked to his suggestion that psychoanalysis is a route to a better moral character. I had thought the purpose of psychoanalysis was to make people happy.
76
If Kronman has evidence that psychoanalysis improves moral character, I would dearly love to see it, especially as he offers no other evidence that moral philosophy can make us better people. (And is psychoanalysis really a branch of moral philosophy, even if it does sometimes conduce to the improvement of character? And should judges think of themselves as the psychoanalysts of the nation?) I do not deny the influence of either the Stoic philosophers or Socrates. But Kronman may be joining character and happiness when he says that "an examined life of virtue is superior" to "[a]n unexamined life of habitual virtue." Id. at 1759.
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[Vol. 1113796 these are not academic moralists in the modern sense -Socrates least of all. And Kronman cites the Stoic philosophers only for their feat of having "reasoned their way into an extraordinary posture of detachment from ordinary human concerns." 77 Indeed so, and with curious results, as when Anaxagoras, upon learning of his child's death, said, "I was already aware that I had begotten a mortal." 78 There is much valuable psychology in the ethics of Stoicism. But the detachment that Kronman describes as "extraordinary" must really be called inhuman, and it suggests that there is danger in too much moral reflection. As I said in my Lectures, moral reflection can make the moral compass wobble. Kronman mentions no moral philosopher more recent than Aristotle. And he could not have named a Stoic philosopher much more recent than the third or fourth century A.D., when philosophical Stoicism petered out, though traces and more than traces can be found in medieval and Renaissance thought, and in Kant and Nietzsche and elsewhere. That Kronman must cast his net so wide to retrieve a handful of dubious examples of moral reasoning's effect on behavior is consistent with his view "that the true spirit of moral reasoning'-which starts from the Socratic premise that it can change the way one lives -is missing from professional philosophy today. ' 79 Indeed it is.
IV. JoHN NOONAN I agree with Judge Noonan's central theses: that one needs a lawgiver if there are to be moral universals, apart from the tautological and the vacuous; that no human lawgiver could lay down universal moral duties; and that, in short, the only tenable ground for believing in a universal moral law is religious. 8 0 And naturally I agree with his criticisms of academic moralism. There is also merit in his point that because "every society fails in the long run," it is impossible to use success as a criterion for evaluating a society."' But he has raised the standard of proof too high. I cannot imagine anyone thinking the Third Reich a success merely because it hung on for twelve years, the last three of them in dreadful shape; it completed none of its major projects except the construction of the autobahns. Thanks to Hitler, TuSCULAN DISPUTATIONS I1.30) . Anaxagoras was himself a pre-Socratic rather than a Stoic, but the statement attributed to him was quoted by the Stoics as an example of the proper reaction to news of the death of one's child. See id. 79 Kronman, supra note 6s, at 1755. 80 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, iiI HARV. L. REv. 1768, 1774 (I998). I must correct him on a minor point. I am not a tenured member of the University of Chicago faculty, or even a voting member. I am strictly an adjunct.
81 Id. at 1771. This is a standard problem with using the "test of time" as an evaluative mechanism. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 64, at i9.
1813 1998] the only major European nation of the nineteenth century that has not just shrunk but completely disappeared is Prussia. But all this is a detail. I said in my Lectures that you can judge the success of a nation relative to its goals, not that you can judge the nation itself on a transcultural standard of morality. And just as I don't think my own "agnosticism" about moral reasoning is "feigned," so I don't think the Supreme Court's agnosticism about the moral issues involved in the abortion and euthanasia cases is feigned . 2 That a case involves a moral issue does not mean that the court must resolve that issue in order to decide the case.
Noonan's examples of moral progress are troubling. Concerning slavery, he points out that "after force had decided what the law should be, a moral consensus emerged."1 3 But what if the South had won the Civil War, which it might well have done? Maybe a moral consensus would not have emerged until much later, when slavery would have become uneconomical. Would that make moral progress a function of warfare? Or does Noonan believe that the North won the war because slavery is immoral, as Lincoln hinted in his second inaugural address? Most scholars think the North won because it was wealthier, more populous, more industrialized, and more centralized, and had an abler president.
Noonan's second example of moral progress is the disapproval of bribery. 8 4 That disapproval is an excellent example of the truth of moral relativism, and not, as he thinks, of its falsity. A bribe is not a natural kind; it is merely a name for forms of compensation that are disapproved. The criteria for disapproval vary from society to society and even within societies, according to distinctions that are often fine. In our society a judge who accepts equal bribes from the disputants, so that his judgment is not affected, is still guilty of a crime; but the identical mode of payment is used for the compensation of arbitrators and is perfectly legal. Threatening to expose someone's secret if he won't pay you for your silence is blackmail, a crime closely related to bribery. (Technically, blackmail is a form of extortion, which is the eliciting of bribes by threats.) But threatening to sue a person if he doesn't settle with you is perfectly legal. These examples show that characterizing a transaction as bribery depends on circumstances that are bound to vary widely across societies and epochs. 
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I no longer doubt -and here I am qualifying a point in my Lectures -that one can speak intelligibly of moral progress. But always one is speaking from a particular standpoint, rather than sub specie aetemitatis. To us, slavery is an abomination, so we consider its abolition a mark of moral progress. There was a time when enough people disagreed to make the issue of the morality of slavery contestable, and such contests cannot be resolved by the use of reason; the issue of slavery, as Noonan remarks, was resolved by war.
Noonan ends his Response with some striking observations about empathy, divinity, and love. To respond to the first: I agree with him that "to see babies is to see human beings,1 8 6 but I don't think that this recognition takes us any distance toward resolving the moral dilemma of abortion on the basis of moral theory. (He may agree with me on this point.) As I mentioned in my Lectures, Robin West asks us to see the woman who dies in a botched illegal abortion as a victim of the laws forbidding abortion. There is no process of reasoning that will tell us which sight should move us more. Noonan's religious beliefs, which inform his views on abortion and other moral issues, are not, I take it, the product of theoretical reflection. There are religious converts, but I do not believe that he is one, and I doubt that theoretical reflection plays a big role in many conversions. 8 7 Finally, I did not intend to draw a sharp line between altruism and love. There is selfish altruism ("reciprocal altruism," for example) and selfish love; there is also selfless altruism, which is a form of selfless love, as Noonan suggests. My doubts concern the possibility of using this insight to power moral reasoning.
V. MARTHA NUSSBAUM Professor Nussbaum is known for treating Greek tragedies, the novels of Henry James, and other works of imaginative literature as works of moral philosophy, and one of her motives for doing so is her opposition, like that of Kronman, to "the academicization and professionalization of philosophy." 8 But, faced with a challenge by an outsider, she closes ranks with the academicized and professionalized moral philosophers and endeavors to catalogue their successes in the 85 See id. HARVARD LAW REVIEW world of action. To make the catalogue at all impressive, she is forced, again much like Kronman, to range far afield -to Rousseau, Cicero, Marx (again!), and Burke, none of whom was an academic; to Amartya Sen, who is primarily an economist rather than a philosopher; and to John Dewey in his capacity as a philosopher of education, which is not the same thing as a moral philosopher. 8 9 Nussbaum suggests that if Cicero and the others were living today, they would be tenured academics, just like herself. 90 But in saying this she reveals that she has missed the point of my distinction between moral entrepreneurs and academic moralists. These are different vocations. The conditions of the modem academy (tenure, specialization, professionalization, physical safety, material comfort, careerism, political irrelevance) make it virtually impossible for its denizens to acquire the vision and prestige of the long-dead philosophers for whom she claims influence -more influence, I might add, than they deserve. I find the idea that the world is more peaceful because of Kant an amazing one.
She gives only two examples of the influence of academic moralism on thought or action in the United States: Peter Singer's advocacy of animal rights and the philosophical literature on bioethics. These are examples of influence, all right, but they are not good examples of the influence of academic moralism. Singer does not write like an academic philosopher (more power to him!) or, more to the point, offer much in the way of philosophical argument. 91 And the best bioethics is the least philosophical. 92 Nussbaum says that "there are many different routes to influence" and adds that "[s]ometimes ethical theorists are also influential politicians. ' (1996) , is written for a general audience. It contains little technical philosophy, makes little effort to respond to philosophical criticisms, and relies heavily on vivid descriptions of animal suffering for its effectiveness. James Jasper calls Singer's book "a gold mine of gruesome photos," but points out that the idea of animal rights, which has been extremely influential (remember the name of the movement), owes nothing to Singer's book (Singer is a utilitarian) and is philosophically dubious. JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST: CUL-TURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 167-68 (1997 REPLY TO CRITICS der of progressive education, which is not a moral system) and Sen (for his success as an economist in getting the United Nations Development Programme to adopt his measure of welfare). 9 6 Most ethical theorists, certainly today, are neither politicians nor entrepreneurs, but writers and teachers. Nussbaum acknowledges the narrowness of the life experience of academic moralists, implies that they should try not to spend their whole lives in the university, concedes that "[t]oo often, our insularity is evident in the way we write," 97 and acknowledges that philosophers encounter difficulties in trying to address a broader audience than their fellow academics, that "the journals in which one must publish to get tenure discourage a more flexible use of style," and that "the jargon-laden nonwriting of the philosophical journals is a good style for persuading no human being." 9 8 Right on. While acknowledging all this, she denies that "good philosophy" is "valueless. "99 I never said it was, my criticisms being limited to academic moralism, that is, modern-day normative moral philosophy. She says that good philosophers who influence people's beliefs are ones who "employ the resources of the imagination [to draw] people into philosophical argument in the way that Plato does, or Cicero, or Hume, or Rousseau, or William James." 1 0 0 All her models are long dead. That is not adventitious. In her references to jargon and insularity and tenure imperatives and never leaving school, Nussbaum, like Kronman, has identified features of modern moral philosophy that show it to be a profession in the Weberian ("disenchanted") sense. This sense is incompatible with moral entrepreneurship and hence with a reasonable expectation that one can alter people's moral beliefs or practices. Normative moral philosophy today is indeed academicized and professionalized.
As evidence that it can nevertheless affect people's behavior, Nussbaum cites a study of rescuers of Jews during World War II, and other 96 The all-time greatest entrepreneur, in her sense, among moral philosophers should be Bentham. I acknowledge that since Sen is also a philosopher, it is possible that his success as a practical entrepreneur owes something, and maybe a lot, to his philosophical training. I further acknowledge the possibility that Nussbaum herself, a prominent "public intellectual," may fit the "practical entrepreneur" bill. She does not claim that, possibly out of modesty, and I will not attempt to evaluate such a claim. 
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Pyrrhonian, who aims at "ridding people of belief."",, I do not advocate peace of mind as the supreme good for man or deny the principle of noncontradiction. I do not argue that "rational argument never persuades people." 1 9 I argue that academic moralism is useless, and I regard Nussbaum's parsing of the differences between neo-Humeans, neo-Aristotelians, and neo-Kantians as just so much sand in the eyes. Rather than relying on the "common presumption that [moral] theories have an influence," 120 a presumption common only to moral theorists, she should have given the reader some examples of how moral theory (not education theory, not economic theory, and not animal rights polemics) is influencing law and public policy in America today.
Nussbaum accepts my characterization of abortion as "chopping up" rather than "pulling the plug." But she adds that if the woman desiring the abortion was raped or a victim of incest, "one [could] argue that even 'chopping up' is a permissible response to a pregnancy resulting from such violent aggression." 12 ' One can argue anything, but this would be a particularly bad argument, since the aggressor is the rapist, not the fetus. Imagine that A shoves B, an innocent bystander, into C, injuring C. Would C be privileged to retaliate against B? Is that really arguable? If that's where moral philosophy leads, we can do without moral philosophy.
Nussbaum claims that I gave too short shrift to Judith Jarvis Thomson's well-known argument for a right to abortion. I thought I had said enough to show that it was a thoroughly bad argument. But since Nussbaum wants amplification, let me give it. The analogy on which Thomson's argument turns 22 fails for the following reasons. First, we can have no reliable intuitions concerning a hypothetical case that is so far outside our experience. Second, a woman normally is not REPLY TO CRITICS immobilized by being pregnant. Third, the fetus is not a stranger to its mother. The law punishes a mother's neglect of her child even if the child was the product of a rape; Thomson does not suggest that she disapproves of such punishment or thinks it anomalous that the parents do not have equivalent legal duties to other people's children. Fourth, it is not obvious that the law should not impose a. general duty to rescue strangers when the rescue can be effected without mortal peril to the rescuer. The laws of many European countries impose such duties, 1 23 and the objections to imposing them are of a practical character unrelated to any moral right not to be a good Samaritan. Fifth, as Nussbaum recognizes, the abortion doctor doesn't merely pull the plug on the fetus.' 2 4 In a first-trimester abortion, he uses surgical instruments or a suction pump to remove the fetus from the uterus. In a second-trimester abortion, he uses surgical instruments to remove the fetus or injects a chemical that either kills the fetus in order to induce premature labor or just induces premature labor. Whatever the method and whatever the stage of the pregnancy, the doctor is employing force for the purpose and with the effect of killing the fetus. And although the killing is a byproduct of the procedure rather than its ultimate goal, the same is true when a child kills his parents in order to inherit their money. The surgical procedure used in second-trimester abortion routinely includes the crushing of the fetus's cranium, and even in first-trimester abortion the fetus is sometimes removed piecemeal, with "the fragments [then] reassembled to see if the fetus is essentially complete," 25 because any fetal tissue remaining in the uterus could cause infection. 2 6 In the rare third-trimester abortion, the doctor kills the fetus either by injecting a chemical into its heart or by drilling a hole in its cranium and removing its spinal fluid through the hole.
The precise medical technique is unimportant, although it is a commentary on the quality of the abortion debate that the supporters of abortion rights never talk about what abortion actually involves, while the opponents never talk about the compelling reasons that women and girls frequently have for deciding to have an abortion. What is important for the present discussion is that abortion is killing rather 
